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Doubts about whether uncertain, future 
benefits will offset certain, immediate costs 
have cooled the British ardor for joining 
the EEC. Some of the doubts reveal much 
about what the Community is and i.8 not. 
The main issues in the forthcoming nego-
tiations are already discernible. 
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"After having totted up the sums and elim-
inated the imponderables -trying to quantify some 
of them-it may well be an act of faith." Thus does 
a senior official of the British Foreign Office 
frankly describe the way in which a decision about 
joining the Common Market, if it comes to that, 
will be made. 
Perfidious Albion taking decisions of great 
diploma tic and commercial importance on the 
basis of faith''! The admission is remarkable not 
only because it is out of character but because all 
the evidence suggests that it is right. It is also 
significant, because the British public, with a 
perverse irony, has become somewhat disenchanted 
with the Common Market just as the prospects for 
joining have improved; the persuasiveness or other-
wise of the arguments for going in thus becomes 
crucial. 
Part of the act of faith is the belief that British 
industry will respond with increased efficiency to 
the competitive stimulus of EEC membership. A 
larger part is the assumption or hope that the 
enlarged Communities will develop in certain ways 
considered favorable to British interests. These 
desirable developments include the adoption of 
effective technological, industrial, and monetary 
policies; institutional improvements; so that the 
Community bodies, which function badly with the 
present six members, will not be completely 
immobilized in a Community of ten or so mem-
bers; more emphasis on industry and less on 
agriculture; and further steps, based on the EEC, 
towards foreign policy coordination and other 
aspects of "political union." That all these features 
would involve ceding important influence to cen-
tral, Community institutions and procedures is a 
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measure of how far British views on European 
organization have evolved. It is a further irony that 
the British seem rather less reluctant to cede those 
powers than the Six at present are, yet are widely 
suspected of being more so. 
Why the case for going in depends on certain 
assumptions that are not verifiable and can scarcely 
be a subject for the entry negotiations will emerge 
as we look at the arguments advanced by some of 
the British government's more articulate critics. 
The arguments will also tell us something about the 
present state of the Communities. But first, what 
has the shift in opinion been'' 
It has occurred both at the level of the man in 
the street and at the level of the opinion leaders. 
The views of the former are reflected clearly, and 
presumably faithfully, in the opinion polls. These 
have shown considerable volatility over the period 
since the first British application was made in July 
1961, and in general the proportion favorable to 
entry has varied directly with the unlikelihood that 
it would happen and with the seriousness of the 
country's economic-financial condition. Positive 
responses to the question "Do you think Britain 
should now try to enter the Common Market or 
not''" reached a level of 62 per cent (to 18 per cent 
opposed) in mid-1966. ln May 1969, just after de 
Gaulle's resignation, the figures were 41 per cent in 
favor, 44 per cent opposed. And in September, 
according to a poll made for the Daily Telegraph. 1 
only 26 per cent were in favor and 57 per cent 
were opposed. Other polls confirmed these figures 
approximately. 
The explanation for this recent change of mind 
was not far to seek. The British press in 1969 was 
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filled with reports on the effect that adoption of 
the Six's Common Agricultural Policy would have 
on the cost of living and balance of payments; and 
these stories more or less coincided with the news 
that after so much "hard slog," the balance of 
payments seemed at last to be on the mend. The 
Pisani Report. one of the studies on British entry 
commissioned by the Monnet committee, esti-
mated that the cost of living would rise by 3.54.0 
per cent in Britain following adoption of the CAP. 
The Guardian published an estimate. allegedly 
made by the British Ministry of Agriculture and 
Central Statistical Office, which put the additional 
balance of payments burden at L400-500 million 
per year. mainly attributable to the levies on food 
imports that would have to be paid to the 
agricultural fund (FEOGA). As if this were not 
horrifying enough, the Financial Tillles 2 estimated 
that the cost would be closer to a billion pounds. 
The Daily Lxpress published a poll which made 
clear that the reason that, by a ten-to-one ratio, 
was more important than any other in explaining 
the layman's opposition to joining the EEC was the 
expected rise in the cost of living. More "sophis-
ticated" commentators pointed out in vain that 
this would be phased over a number of years and 
that the cost of living was already, as a result of 
other factors, increasing at a considerable rate. 
Little wonder that the government found it ad-
visable to publish its own best estimates in a White 
Paper and then agonized over the way to present it, 
so as neither to scare off domestic opinion nor 
weaken its negotiating hand. 
Politically attuned ears were quick to hear the 
rumble. ln July, forty-five M.P.'s of all parties 
introduced a motion asking the government to 
suspend its application for the time being. Nu-
merous statements in the summer and autumn by 
trade union organizations and their spokesmen 
called into question, at the least, the desirability of 
entering unless more favorable terms could be 
obtained than those on which the above estimates 
were made. A movement was launched, complete 
with advertisements in The Times, to put the issue 
to the British people in a referendum. And at the 
annual Labour Party conference in October, anti-
Market sentiment appeared to be coming to a head 
in a widely-supported resolution, until the issue 
was skillfully defused by the party leadership. 
More serious than this minor flak, and perhaps 
even more revealing than the polls, was the fact 
that the anti-Market position was embraced hy Mr. 
Enoch Powell, the brilliant and maverick Tory with 
a demagogue's unerring instinct for a ripe issue. an 
impeccable sense of timing, and an oratorical 
prowess that has evoked comparisons \Vith 
Churchill. In a carefully-worded and -constructed. 
well-publicized speech on September 5. Mr. Powell. 
who had been a pro-EEC minister in the Macmillan 
government that first applied to join, claimed now 
to detect a new mood in the country. "l t is to 
demand that a clear, definite and cast-iron case he 
made out before Britain is again committed to 
accede to the Treaty of Rome." All the reasoning 
of the speech combined to oppose entry but. 
carefully probing, he refrained from stating that 
conclusion explicitly. Although there was appre-
hension that he would repeat his arguments at the 
Conservative party conference in October. he 
refrained from the showdown with the party 
leadership that that would have entailed. But he 
has subsequently returned to the subject. which 
now takes up part of the performing time he 
formerly reserved exclusively for his inflammatory 
theatrics on the racial question. 
The skillfully presented arguments of Powell 
form a kind of bridge between the negative "gut" 
reaction of the man who foresees his food bills 
rising and the more reasoned (but not necessarily 
better-founded or more important) doubts of a 
second category of critics: the economists. pub-
licists. and intellectuals, many of whom arc former 
believers in the Community idea and were sup-
porters of the British application to join in 
1961-63. Their open-minded re-examination of the 
arguments for entry in the conditions of 1969 led 
to considerably more doubtful, qualified con-
clusions than many or them had reached on earlier 
occasions. This can be said of the editorials of the 
Guardian, the opinion columns of the Financial 
Times, numerous letters in The Ti/Iles and the 
Economist, and the thorough, detailed. revised 
statement of the employers' group. the Confed-
eration of British Industry (CBl). 3 A composite 
argument, drawn from their many points of view, 
would run something like the following: 
The costs of entering the EEC arc 
evidcn t and would begin to ta kc effect 
immediately upon entry. Although esti-
mates depend strongly on the assumptions 
made, it is not impossible to arrive at 
reasonably convincing conclusions about 
the order of magnitude of the costs. The 
benefits, on the other hand, are inherently 
unquantifiable and in any case would take 
longer to appear. Some of them depend on 
the EEC's evolving in a certain way and, if 
it does not do so, will not materiaUze. 
Some of them, moreover, could perhaps 
be achieved without joining the EEC and 
paying the costs that entails. 
Costs 
Entry would involve a variety of costs: 
to the national income, to the balance of 
payments, to the Exchequer, and to the 
cost of living. We have already noted that 
the last of these would likely be an 
increase of 3.5-4.0 per cent (the range in 
the CBI estimate is 3.5-6.0 per cent). Its 
political importance is obvious. Of un-
questionably greater economic impor-
tance, however, is the effect membership 
would have on the balance of payments. 
Omitting for the moment the possible 
beneficia l effects, it is clear that several 
factors would tend to worsen the balance 
of payments. The most important of 
these, of course, is the payment of levies 
on food imports as the UK adopted the 
Community's agricultural policy. Several 
estimates conclude that if the financial 
system in effect in 1969 were applied to 
the United Kingdom without change, the 
cost would be in the neighborhood of one 
billion dollars per year; the Pisani Report 
pointed out, however, that as this would 
mean paying over 50 per cent of the 
Seven's total agricultural outlay, it was 
manifestly unfair and a reduction should 
be negotiable. Most estimates therefore 
conclude that the net result would be 
more like $400-500 million per year.4 To 
this would have to be added the likely 
negative effect on capital movements of 
the adoption of those regulations in force 
in the EEC which partially free such 
movements; the loss of exports resulting 
from the elimination of Commonwealth 
preference; and the loss of exports 
through higher export prices caused by the 
higher cost of living. The resultant gross 
negative effect on the balance of payments 
-3- JM-3-'70 
is thus likely to be of the order of several 
hundred million pounds per year, to be 
reached gradually over the transition 
period of several years, and perhaps dimin-
ishing in the I 980's depending on the 
future of the CAP. The Economist's guess-
timate is L500m; opponents have put the 
figure higher, closer to i, I ,OOOm.5 
It is true that there has been a remark-
able improvement in the United King-
dom 's balance of payments during 1969, 
and that at the moment it looks like 
continuing to run a surplus, at the rate of 
a few hundred mi ll ion pounds per year, 
into the immediate future. Let us assume 
away , for the sake of argument, the 
precariousness of this state of affairs-even 
though the present, apparently rampant 
wage inflation in the United Kingdom, as 
well as the prospect of a slowdown in the 
rate of growth of world trade, make this a 
big assumption indeed. Even if the surplus 
continues at the present level , it is in large 
measure pre-empted by obligations to 
repay the sizable debts incurred by the 
country before and after the devaluation 
of the pound in 1967. The total medium-
and long-term indebtedness of the United 
Kingdom was officially reckoned in 
November to be L3,426 million, of which 
i...1,436 million had been incurred since 
October 15, 1964. Obligations to repay 
principal and interest on these debts-and 
leaving aside the question of short-term 
indebtedness, on which the figures are not 
available-during the next five years are 
estimated to average i.300-400 million pe r 
year.6 If entry is to be achieved before 
that date , there is little if any margin to 
pay additional costs imposed by the 
adoption of the CAP. Moreover, to the 
extent to which additional doses of de-
flation will have to be imposed to main-
tain existing or to run larger surpluses, the 
most important real benefit of EEC mem-
bership, a higher economic growth rate, 
will be foreclosed . This is the nub of the 
reservation of the CBl's report, which 
unlike its 1966 predecessor, expresses 
serious reservations about entry. Sir 
Arthur Norman, the CBl's president, sum-
marized them this way: "The will is there 
\ 
JM-3-'70 
in as great a measure as it was in 1966-67, 
but the will to sign the cheque is not as 
strong, because of fears that it may be too 
big. " 7 The report's expression of this 
point is crucial enough to deserve quo-
tation: 
It is not possibk to establish at this 
point in time what cost to the balance 
of payments would be unacceptable. 
If at the end of any transitional period 
the UK is running a substantial and 
continuing balance of payments sur-
plus, co-existing with an adequate 
degree of domestic economic growth. 
a substantial CAP balance of pay-
mc n ts burden could be carried, at the 
cost only of a lower level of accumu-
lation of reserves, and possibly some 
rescheduling of debt payments. Such a 
cost would be reaL but in no sense 
intolerable. If. on the other hand, 
such circumstances did not obtain or 
the cost of the CAP was beyond the 
ability of the balance of payments to 
bear. taking the UK's debt obligations 
into account. it could only be met by 
a degree of domestic deflation which 
would endanger the achievement of 
the faster rate of growth-to which we 
look to meet the national income cost 
of the CAP and to provide the main 
economic advantage of entry into the 
EEC. 8 
This analysis presupposes that the main 
instrument available to stimulate balance 
of payments surpluses after entry will be 
deflation, as the other possible means-
restrictions on imports and on capital 
movements, devaluation-are ruled out by 
Community rules. This seems a realistic 
assumption. I f. however. the government 
retained the right (and the willingness to 
use it) to vary the exchange rate for 
sterling. then the major part or the cost of 
entry would not be the national income 
loss produced by deflation, which would 
then be less necessary: it would rather be 
the real transfer of resources represented 
by the contribution to FEOGA. coupled 
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with the opportunity cost or keeping too 
many farmers as a result of high agricul-
tural prices. These costs are not un-
bearably high. In Samuel Brittan's view 
the point emerges clearly: entry is worth-
while if exchange rate freedom can be 
maintained (and a few other conditions 
are met). and if it cannot be. then the 
benefits of a floating pound would be 
greater than those of EEC memhership.9 
Benefits 
In spite of the doubts cited above. the 
CBI, for one. is in favor of entry, on 
balance, because it foresees positive effects 
capable of more than offsetting-given 
satisfactory terms as a result of the nego-
tiations the above-mentioned costs. What 
would these positive effects be? 
Scarcely anyone puts much store today 
by the purely tariff effects of entry. Given 
the application of the tariff reductions 
agreed in the Kennedy Round, the average 
tariff rate by 1972 will be only 11.3 per 
cent for the United States. I 0.2 per cent 
for the United Kingdom, and 7 .6 per cent 
for the Community's Common External 
Tariff. At this low level, tariffs become 
clearly of secondary importance to the 
host of nontariff obstacles that still exist 
between Britain and the Six. and, to a 
considerahle extent_ among the Six them-
selves. Moreover, many British enterprises 
have already invested in plant within the 
EEC in order to get inside the tariff wall 
and get nearer their market. 
The main advantages, the so-called 
'"dynamic" effects. are of another order. 
and pertain to the consequences over time 
for productivity and national income in 
Britain. These, it is held. would be stimu-
lated in several ways. The increased com-
petition from the Six would promote 
greater efficiency among British pro-
ducers. Britain's exports would be redi-
rected towards an area or large GNP, a fast 
rate or growth and a high marginal 
propensity to import. Access to a larger 
"home" market would permit benefits 
from greater specialization and from 
economies. of scale, especia11y in those 
industries where research and development 
costs arc high and where it is therefore 
difficult to compete with the giants 
(mostly American) unless one has a large 
domestic market as a base from which to 
expand. Adoption of the EEC's Value 
Added Tax would stimulate a higher rate 
of investment m Britain. Investment 
would, moreover, be more inte11igently 
made if it were freed as only a decision to 
enter could free it-from the uncertainty 
of the past several years about future 
relations between the British and con-
tinental markets. 
Cumulatively, these effects could result 
111 a quickening of the rate of growth of 
more than the one per cent per year that 
the CBI estimates would be required to 
offset the real loss represented by the 
contribution to the CAP. They could also 
offset the 4c500 mi11ion adverse effects on 
the balance of payments, thus making 
irrelevant the concern about debt repay-
ment and deflation. These gains, of course, 
would not be once-for-an but continuing. 
In addition. there is the negative advantage 
of avoiding the (equa11y unquantifiable) 
costs that continued exclusion from the 
EEC would involve. Finally we come to 
the junction of the economic arguments 
with the political ones-which are so 
often. usually without being specified, 
claimed to be the decisive ones. Partici-
pation in an industrial area of the Seven 
(or the Ten), with a common legal, fiscal, 
and regulatory environment, would permit 
the cross-frontier collaboration that would 
make it possible for British industry to 
achieve the restructuring needed for 
greater productivity without creating 
national monopolies or other market-
dominating, competition-restricting situ-
ations. And it is the achievement of these 
economies that would permit the 
Europeans, their crippling fragmentation 




All this would be well enough if several 
of the alleged benefits did not rest on 
dubious premises. 
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(I) While it is true that membership in 
the EEC would mean increased com-
petition for British firms, it is not certain 
that they would respond adequately. Or. if 
they did, the resulting increase in pro-
ductivity could equally well be achieved 
by a unilateral reduction of tariffs. True, 
this would result in less favorable terms of 
trade than would a mutual tariff reduc-
tion, but it wouldn't entail the other costs 
associated with joining the EEC. 
(2) The "redirection" of British exports 
towards the EEC doesn't depend in any 
critical way on membership. It has in fact 
been strongly under way while Britain has 
been outside the EEC: from 1959 to 1966 
Britain's trade with the EEC grew at more 
than twice the rate of its total trade (132 
per cent against 65 per cent)'. 1 0 Insofar as 
there is a further shift, it would mainly be 
the result of psychological factors a vague 
feeling that Britain + EEC were now "'one 
market" - rather than concrete new facts. 
That is not to deny that it could be very 
important, only to suggest that it is an 
uncertain element on which to base major 
decisions. And the progress towards 
economic union made by the Six so far is 
much too limited to claim that they 
constitute in an important sense "one 
domestic market." 
(3) The economies of scale, more 
effective utilization of research and devel-
opment funds, and common industrial 
policy may indeed be desirable, especially 
for a country with Britain's industrial 
structure, and particularly its overemploy-
ment in such industries as atomic energy 
and aircraft, which need extra outlets in 
order to ease the pressures for contraction. 
But it requires a great gulp of credulity to 
suppose that membership or the EEC' wi11 
automatically result in the adoption of 
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Jean Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe meets for the first lime with British 
participants participants-London, March 1969. From right to left: German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt; 
British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart; George Brown. 
such policies, and a fair amount of faith to 
believe that they will be forthcoming even 
with much effort. They have so far made 
little progress because the existing mem-
bers are unwilling to surrender national 
prerogatives or because they hold con-
flicting views about what kind of common 
policy there should be. 1 1 Will this prob-
lem, and in particular the French fear that 
its smaller firms may be swallowed up 
before they have had time to achieve 
restructuring on a national level, be eased 
by British entry? lt seems doubtful. And 
will the demanding requirements such 
policies would imply for effective institu-
tions be fulfilled? The EEC's institutions 
work badly at present, and it is hard to 
imagine that-barring an explicit political 
commitment to improve them-they will 
work any less badly with seven or ten 
members. 
To summarize the economic arguments, 
entry may or may not be beneficial in the 
end, but that outcome is not assured. Nor 
is Britain compelled to join by an unsat-
isfactory economic situation. As Sir 
Gordon Newton, the editor of the Fin-
ancial Times concludes, Britain is "per-
fectly capable of standing outside-more 
so today than for years past." 
Finally, as for the vague "political 
reasons" for going in, their force also 
diminishes as the premise that the EEC is 
the necessary foundation for any 
European political cooperation comes into 
question. The British, who were slow to 
accept this premise, later embraced it so 
completely that "going into Europe" came 
to be---and in the pro-Common Market 
press, still is--synonymous with "joining 
the EEC." But in the latter part of the 
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Jean Monnet (left) talks with Walter Hallstein and Michael Stewart at July 1969 meeting of Monnet 
committee in Brussels. 
l 960's. as the EEC bogged down in its 
morass of butter surpluses and overstaffed, 
immobilized institutions, the premise 
began to look doubtful. The political 
events of 1969, including the Hague sum-
mit, tended to reaffirm its validity; but it 
is difficult to accept any longer as an 
assumption not to be questioned. 
Although his own paper was as guilty as 
anyone, Peter Jay, Economic Editor of 
The Times, raised the question whether 
the British press should not "cease using 
'Europe' and 'EEC' as synonymous and 
stop using 'anti-European' as a label for 
those who, though they may love Europe 
and desire its unity, are 'opposed to 
Britain signing the Treaty of Rome now 
without more amendment than seems 
likely to be acceptable to the existing 
members of the Six?' If you need a 
headline phrase, l suggest 'anti-Brussels' 
or, 'anti-little-European,' or 'liberal 
European,' or 'anti-Reich' or, perhaps, just 
'pro-European.' " 1 2 Similarly, Samuel 
Brittan points out the need for distin-
guishing between a "European approach'' 
to foreign affairs and the "top-heavy 
institutions of Brussels. The Common Mar-
ket Commission has had a remarkable 
success in promulgating the view that 
there is some thing idealistic in proposals 
that increase its own role." 1 3 
* * * * * 
If the foregoing argument was winning over or 
at least making neutral increasing numbers of 
thoughtful Britons, it was not making much 
headway with the political Establishment. All three 
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political parties remained committed to the objec-
tive of entry, and this commitment was endorsed 
anew at the three party conferences in the autumn 
of 1969, despite the "antis" in the ranks of all 
three groups: Labour still has its left-wing oppo-
nents to contend with, the Tories their right-wing. 
Douglas Jay, Immanuel Shin well, and Derek 
Walker-Smith are all still there, in addition to 
Enoch Powell. The Liberals-and this is something 
new for the party which first advocated entry into 
the EEC. and has consistently been more 
"European" than the larger parties-at their 1969 
meeting had to cope for the first time with critics 
of the idea, especially among the militant young 
Liberals. 
In March 1969, the three parties joined the 
Monnet committee (Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe), which held its first 
meeting in London. (In joining, they just preceded 
the Independent Republicans of Giscard 
Sir Con O'Neill, Deputy Under Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, with special 
responsibility for Common Market negotiations. 
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George Thomson, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
in charge of British relations with Europe. 
d'Estaing.) High-level British delegations attended 
its meetings in March, July, and December. The 
government, although unwilling to appear more 
papist than Rome by proclaiming its commitment 
to a federal Europe, did publicly declare and repeat 
its support of the political objectives of the Treaty 
of Rome (or, as they were called in the Hague 
communique, the political "finalities." These are 
mainly implicit, not explicit, in the Treaty, the 
clearest affirmation of which is that contained in 
the preamble: "determined to establish the basis of 
an ever closer union among the European peo-
ples"). In April, on the occasion of the state visit 
to London of Italian President Saragat, a joint 
declaration was issued that constituted a clear and 
eloquent commitment to the objectives of 
European unity. It affirmed, among other things, 
that "the economic and political integration of 
Europe are both essential"; that "Europe must 
increasingly develop a common foreign policy"; 
and that "the European Communities remain the 
basis for European unity." 1 4 
There followed a series of pro-European 
speeches which. coming as they did immediately 
after de Gaulle's withdrawal, took on collectively 
the air of a diplomatic offensive. although it is 
doubtful that this effect was intended. Mr. Wilson, 
in a message of congratulations to Pompidou and 
in a speech to the Socialist International in 
Eastbourne; Lord Chalfant. in an address to the 
Western European Union assembly; the f'oreign 
Office, in an official commentary on the election 
of Pompidou; and George Brown, no longer a 
minister but still a quasi-official spokesman, in 
speeches at Eastbourne and elsewhere-all spoke of 
the new possibilities, and new decisions, that were 
imminent with a new French government. As that 
government was still in the process of formation, 
such statements appeared to many. both in Britain 
and among her well-wishers in the Six, to be 
prcma turc and possibly counterproductive. This 
mildly aggressive posture, whether deliberately 
intended or merely the result of an irrepressible 
need to express one's hopes now that the main 
obstacle to their realization was at last gone, soon 
gave way to greater discretion. Ministerial responsi-
bilities for dealing with "Europe" were passed 
from Lord Chalfant, whose aggressive "Euro-
peanism" had led him to commit more than one 
diploma tic gaff in the past, to George Thomson, 
with Sir Con O'Neill, former Permanent Under-
secretary at the Foreign Office, as backup. 
Since domestic opinion was changing per-
ceptibly during the summer and autumn, and good 
news about the British economy was at last coming 
in, the government's tone became somewhat more 
coy. There were statements such as "Europe needs 
us just as much as. and many would say more than, 
we need Europe" (Wilson to the Labour Party 
Conference), and there was more emphasis put on 
the importance of the terms that could be ob-
tained, and on the need for adaptations in the 
CAP. Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, 
gratuitously cast doubts on his government's 
willingness to see the European Parliament directly 
elected. But by and large the political commitment 
has remained clear, and the forceful diplomacy 
occasionally reappears, as at the WEU council 
meetings in January, when the British delegates 
pressed the five for assurances -which, in view of 
the Hague communique, seemed superfluous to 
some-that decisions on political union would not 
be taken before Britain could be a party to them. 
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Outside the government. too, the '·Establish-
ment" remained on the whole in favor of joining. 
Lord Gladwyn continued his tireless babbling and 
pamphleteering in favor of supranational solutions. 
Lord Harlech ( who as David Ormsby-Gore had 
been ambassador in Washington during the 
Kennedy period) now chairman of the British 
Council of the European Movement, advocated 
reform and expansion of the EEC and the creation 
of a political community. Press coverage has been 
extensive. Most newspapers arc favorable to entry 
and optimistic (sometimes to excess) about the 
prospects for clearing up the problems involved. 
(Perhaps they have been infected with the tactical. 
self-fulfilling optimism that has long characterized 
many of the convinced "Europeans", including 
Monnet and the men around him.) Although 
Bcaverbrook's Daily Express remains violently 
opposed and the Financial Times and the Guardian 
have doubts, the l'."co11omist. the Daily Telegraph, 
and The Times remain firmly in favor. The Times. 
moreover, has displayed under its new management 
a quite remarkable commitment to Europe in the 
broader sense. Its coverage of both the French and 
German elections reflected a keen awareness of the 
British stake in the outcomes. In the latter case. 
the newspaper commissioned a poll shortly before 
the election and the results were immediately 
published in disregard to the German government's 
policy of trying to prevent the publication of polls 
before election day (a policy which failed in any 
case); editorially, The Times wrote: "We arc all. or 
almost all, Social Democrats or Christian Demo-
crats now." 1 5 On New Year's Day, 1970, it 
announced itself to be "A European newspaper." 
* * * * * 
So much for the state of mind of one of the 
principals on the eve of the negotiations, which arc 
expected to begin next summer. Taking into 
account also the views of the Six, what are the 
issues in the talks likely to be, and how might they 
be handled? What can be said about the schedule 
according to which they will be held and con-
cluded? 
Any reduction of the long list of interconnected 
issues to a few principal categories is somewhat 
arbitrary. With that qualification, the following 
four rubrics more or less delimit the "strategic" 
issues to which both the British government and 
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the EEC Commission have said they wish to see the 
negotiations limi led: limiting the balance-of-
payments cost to Britain; Commonwealth prob-
lems; monetary problems; and institutional 
questions. 
Capping the Cost of the CAP 
The first will probably be the key issue. One 
instrument for dealing with it is the length of the 
transition period the British will have to apply 
fully the CAP, which is the main source of the 
problem, and the regulations liberalizing move-
ments of capital, which is the secondary source. A 
second instrument could be the imposition of some 
kind of ceiling-which could be variously defined 
and calculated- on British contributions to the 
agricultural fund. This is in effect what the Six 
have done for themselves for the period to 1978, in 
the agreements reached last December. In the 
absence of such a ceiling, and assuming current 
agricultural trade and expenditure patterns, the 
annual cost to Britain from 1978-under the new 
financial arrangement-would not be far from the 
Pisani estimate, which was based on the 1969 
system: $ l.l billion, an amount which that report 
found to be unfair, as it constituted over 50 per 
cent of the total for Britain plus the Six. 
The British are heartened on this score by two 
recent developments within the Six: (1) the 
December agreements provide the Six themselves a 
generously long period (to 1978) to abolish the 
ceilings, negotiated as political agreements, on 
national contributions to the common fund. The 
British feel this arms them with good precedent for 
making their own case. (2) The surplus problem in 
the Six, coupled with the shock of recent changes 
in monetary parity and the prospect of repeated 
changes in the future has made the CAP look 
somewhat precarious. The British reaction to these 
developments, apart from a natural feeling of 
Schadenfreude. has been to take heart at the signs 
that after joining they may have some allies within 
the Six who favor major adaptations of the CAP, in 
directions favorable to them. Recent German 
pressure to get costs and surpluses under control is 
one such indication. Increased support in both 
France and Germany for the idea of making 
subsidies less directly related to production an 
idea which is characteristic of the deficiency 
payments system in effect in Britain -is another. 
This does not mean there is any question of a 180 
degree change in the principle of the CAP. but it 
docs mean that its future modifications need not 
be consistently disadvantageous to Britain. 
On the other hand. the surplus problem will be 
far from solved by the admission of the new 
candidates, food importers though they are on the 
whole. Even though a Community of the Ten 
would be somewhat less self-sufficient in food than 
the present Six (85 per cent instead of 90 per 
cent), over-all production would be likely to 
increase as a result of the stimulus to British 
production provided by the raising of prices. (For 
the United Kingdom, the present self-sufficiency 
rate of 50 per cent could increase to something like 
65 per cent.) The same would occur in Denmark. 
And world markets would then become even more 
glutted as the displaced suppliers of the United 
Kingdom market sought alternative outlets, in 
competition with exports from the Community. 
The Commission. aware of these problems. stressed 
in its Opinion the need to proceed vigorously with 
the Mansholt Plan for structural reform of agricul-
ture in the Six as well as for the conclusion of 
effective commodity agreements on a world scale. 
in the event of the Community's enlargement. 
As for the adaptation of the financial regulation 
in accordance with British needs. it should be 
pointed out that under the terms of the December 
agreement, any modification must be unanimously 
agreed by the present Six: thus France has a veto. 
Ultimately a political agreement will have to be 
reached, if it can, between the maximum the 
British are willing to pay and the minimum the 
French are willing to accept. The latter have 
already indicated a willingness to agree to a longer 
transition period in proportion as the British 
contribution to the CAP is larger. 
Commonwealth 
Many of the Commonwealth problems that so 
delayed the last negotiations in 1961-63 will no 
longer be relevant this time, as a result partly of 
the reorientation of Commonwealth trade that has 
taken place in the meantime, partly of the Com-
munity's willingness to conclude an association 
agreement with African and, in principle, 
Caribbean Commonwealth countries, and partly 
because some issues are subsumed under the larger 
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topical question of generalized preferences by 
industrialized countries in favor of developing 
countries. The two major problems which remain 
are those caused by New Zealand's acute depen-
dency on United Kingdom markets. a dependency 
especially concentrated on one commodity 
(butter), and those arising out of the United 
Kingdom's commitments under the Common-
wealth Sugar Agreement, due to expire at the end 
of 1974, which affects a number of Common-
wealth suppliers such as Mauritius, Fiji, and the 
Caribbean members. As both these commodities 
are in surplus in the Community, a solution is not 
laughably easy. On the other hand, as is clear from 
the Pisani Report, assuming responsible modifi-
cations of Community policies in these areas-
modifications which are mandatory whether or not 
Britain comes in-plus a reasonable transition 
period, these problems are not insunnountablc. 
The New Zealand representative who made the 
rounds of the Six last autumn found they still 
accepted, as in 1 961-63, the need for a "special 
arrangement" for his country in the case of British 
adhesion. And the sugar problem is made some-
what more approachable by the fact that the 
existing commitments of the Six expire more or 
less at the same time as the Commonwealth 
Agreement. 
Monetary Issues 
The monetary issues related to Britain's entry 
are so broad, numerous, and complicated that to 
settle them exhaustively would require practically 
separate full-scale talks. It is more likely that, in 
the event of successful negotiations, many will be 
left to be handled after entry. There are nonethe-
less a number of questions on which the two sides 
need at least to form tentative conclusions. 
The Six would like to be assured against being 
affected by measures (such as devaluation, 
deflation, trade, and exchange restrictions) intro-
duced by Britain in order to meet its external 
financial obligations, whether stemming from CAP 
contributions, sterling balances, or indebtedness to 
central banks and international financial institu-
tions. This concern was particularly marked in the 
Commission's 1967 Opinion. It is less pronounced 
in the 1969 version because of the improvements 
that have taken place in the meantime in the 
British balance of payments, and because the Basic 
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agreements tend to diminish the destabilizing 
possibilities of sterling's reserve role. But the 
increased indebtedness. plus the question of what 
happens when the present Basle arrangements 
expire in 1971. still occasion some doubts which 
the British negotiators will no doubt be invited to 
allay. Already in 1967 the British sought to case 
this concern. not en tircly successfully, by under-
taking not to invoke Article I 08 of the Rome 
Treaty (authorizing exceptional measures in case of 
balance of payments difficulties) "to deal with 
problems ans111g from outside factors" (the 
Sterling Arca). 
The Six will also want to know how British 
membership will affect their efforts to manage 
their existing monetary dilemma: how to run the 
Common Market without permanently fixed ex-
change rates; or, if that is not possible, how to 
galvanize the will necessary to achieve the far-
reaching economic policy coordination that is 
necessary if rates are to he kept fixed. This 
question is now one of the greatest preoccupations 
of the Six. and the so-called Barre Plan. now in 
process of implementation, represents a first step 
towards coming to grips with it. 
The paper written for the Monnet committee by 
Signor Guido Carli, Governor of the Bank of Italy, 
took the position that even without Britain the Six 
would be unable to fix their currencies with 
respect to each other in the immediate future, 
although he thought in the longer terms it would 
be achieved. In order to avoid the kind of dramatic 
and destabilizing effects of adjustments that are 
postponed too long, he proposed arrangements for 
limited (maximum 2 per cent per year) exchange 
rate variations within the Six at monthly or 
quarterly intervals. This, he argued, would facil-
itate British entry, and would provide time for the 
achievement of the effective economic coor-
dination which would eventually allow the en-
larged EEC to form a monetary union, whose 
currency would then float in relation to the dollar. 
The Six, and especially the Commission, are not 
yet prepared to admit that their efforts to achieve 
effective economic coordination will move so 
slowly. So they reject the Carli conclusion, which 
is regarded as incompatible with the CAP as 
presently practiced and hence is considered some-
thing of a pis al/er. On the other hand, it seems 
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quite improbable that they will have attained 
monetary union by the time negotiations with the 
applicants conclude. It therefore is likely that the 
British may have to be accepted as a monetary 
pig-in-a-poke, whose effect on this still unsettled 
question will look far from certain at the time of 
en try. 
On the other side, the British will be wondering 
whether the monetary aspect of membership will 
be such as to worsen or alleviate their already 
considerable financial problems. On the one hand, 
entry will impose new balance of payments bur-
dens while at the same time it will entail sLmen-
dering most of the instruments useful for managing 
that burden: exchange and trade restrictions, pre-
sumably devaluation, and perhaps deflation in-
duced for external reasons will all be if not 
disallowed at least subject to some Community 
scrutiny. On the other, ir the EEC is successful in 
making arrangements for medium-term economic 
assistance. this could be very valuable insurance for 
the British and could perhaps also offer a means of 
replacing the l3asle arrangements, which are due to 
explfe 111 1971. Professor Robert Triffo, has 
pointed out that most of the money lent to the 
British in 1965-68 by foreign central banks plus 
the International Monetary Fund came, directly or 
indirectly, from the Six. If an enlarged EEC were 
to make an institutionalizl'd undertaking to sup-
port sterling, it would thus not be an entirely new 
burden: and it might have the advantage or 
carrying a more effective influence on British 
domestic economic policy. Proposals for the trans-
fer of Britain's debts to the Bank for International 
Settlements. and the transformation of the latter 
into a kind of forerunner of a European central 
bank, have been made by Mr. Charles Villiers, the 
Managing Director of Britain's Industrial Reorgan-
isation Corporation. 1 6 
To summarize. the capital importance or this 
subject will make it unavoidably a part of the 
negotiations; but the difficulty of the Six in 
defining a common position, for reasons not 
directly related to British entry, makes it probable 
that monetary issues will be largely left in abey-
ance, to be dealt with (if the talks are successful) 
according to the normal institutional processes of 
an enlarged Community. 
Institutions 
The dominant theme of the Commission's 1969 
Opinion on enlargement is the urgent need to 
insure that the admission of new members docs not 
result in reduced effectiveness of the Community's 
institutions and procedures. Apart from listing the 
Commission proposals on which Council decisions 
arc outstanding, and calling for a general commit-
ment by the applicant countries to the principle of 
reinforcement, it propose~ two concrete steps in 
this direction. The first is a reaffirmation by both 
member and applicant countries of their \ViHing-
ness to practice the treaty provisions on mJjority 
voting in the Council of Ministers in those cases 
where it is called for, or where other techniques arc 
not prescribed. M. Rey was even more emphatic on 
this point when he spoke to the press in October: 
''We have said and we will say to our governments 
and to the Council that we cannot run the risk of 
enlarging the Community unless we restore in 
proper fashion the institutional mechanisms \Vhich 
arc foreseen in the Treaty and which do not 
function well at present.'· Second. in order that the 
functioning of the Community should not be 
hampered by disagreement on those questions 
where unanimous voting is called for, the Com-
mission suggests that the applicant and member 
countries seek to reach agreements in principle on 
such questions during the negotiations themselves. 
The Opinion also reaffirms the need to rein force 
the budgetary powers of the European Parliament 
and to provide for its direct election. 
What is the British position on these vital 
questions'? Government statements have been less 
than crystal clear, in order to avoid riling those 
sectors of domestic opinion ardently opposed to 
any ''sacrifice of sovereignty." The British have 
been aided in this posture by the dclibnatcly 
noncomrni ttal stance of the Six on some of the 
questions: this allows them to say, withont fear of 
embarrassment: "We'll accept whatever the Six will 
accept, no more, no less." But despite this delib-
erate ambiguity, public statements have implied, 
and private affirmations confirmed, a British com-
mitment to abide by the letter and spirit or the 
Treaty of Rome, including the provisions on 
majority voting. This is. in fact, the British 
rejoinder to the objection that in an enlarged 
Community the machinery would be nnwieldy. On 
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the question of whether the European Parliament 
should be directly elected, the attitude is more 
genuinely ambiguous. On the one hand, the govern-
ment in the joint declaration with President 
Saragat affirmed their support of the idea; and a 
democratic character is one of the characteristics 
of an enlarged Community to which government 
spokesmen usually attach great importance. On the 
other, Mr. Stewart's remarks at the Monnet com-
mittee meeting in July were as lukewarm as those 
of the Six (who, at the Hague. only agreed to study 
the idea further). He approved in principle, but 
thought the time not ripe. 
Apart from the commitment to reinforcement. 
various institutional questions will be raised by the 
mere arithmetic of entry. It will be necessary to 
decide how many members each country should 
have in the Commission, the Parliament, and the 
Court. what weighting of votes in the Council 
would be appropriate. how to manage the problem 
of three more official languages. etc. These de-
cisions arc unlikely to prove controversial. It is not 
difficult to extend the principles of the present 
system through appropriate mathematical modifi-
cations.' 7 One significant implication is that the 
requirement that each state shall have at least one 
representative on the Commission would produce a 
fourteen-man body (the present number). rather 
than the nine-man group that is foreseen in the 
fusion treaty and that is presently scheduled to be 
installed at the middle of this year. The limiting 
factor is Luxembourg. The resulting apportion-
ment would be one member each for Luxembourg, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and 
Ireland; and two members from the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. 
The Timetable 
The Commission in its Opinion, as well as the 
British government, has taken the view that nego-
tiations should be limited to the minimum number 
of important political issues. leaving minor matters 
to be dealt with after enlargement by the regular 
institutions. The present view is that negotiations 
can with luck be concluded in about a year and 
that they will have failed if they go on longer than 
eighteen months. If this schedule is held, it means 
that the talks should be finished before the end of 
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1971. Allowing a year for ratification, the appli-
cants could enter by the beginning of 1973. after 
which there would be a transition period of several 
years. Procedurally. the negotiations seem likely to 
be conducted for the Community in part by the 
Commission- on matters within its competence, 
like the Common External Tariff. and on technical 
matters of no great political importance- and in 
part by the member states. The idea was suggested 
by the Commission as a natural step in view of the 
problems of the 1961-63 negotiations. and of the 
success of the method used in the Kennedy Round. 
when the Council defined the mandates. and the 
Commission negotiated. The French readily 
accepted the idea. 
The Commission also foresees that negotiations 
with the various applicant countries will not be 
conducted exactly in parallel. the important thing 
being to proceed with the British far enough to see 
some light before beginning talks with the others. 
whose candidacies necessarily depend on that of 
the British. The actual entry of the various 
countries and the length of the transition periods 
should be the same for all. however. in the 
Commission view. Finally, "discussions" (as 
opposed to negotiations) arc. according to the 
Hague communique, to be opened with the non-
applicant EFTA countries having expressed a desire 
for them, once the negotiations with Britain arc 
under way. The broader question of what kind of 
arrangements can be found for the neutrals remains 
complicated, uncertain. and bound up closely with 
the Danish and Norwegian applications. The 
Nordck (Nordic Economic Union) proposal is now 
competitive with the EEC in the domestic politics 
of those two countries. No solution is yet apparent 
for Finland if that project dissolves and the other 
Scandinavian countries join or associate with the 
EEC. Neither is there yet a clear way out of the 
dilemma of which one horn is the unwillingness or 
inability of the neutrals to become full members. 
and the coolness of the Commission- and. anach-
ronistically, of the United States to their ac-
quiring associate status. 
The negotiations are also certain to influence 
and be influenced by the timing and content of the 
election campaign that must take place in Britain 
between now and the spring of 1971. from the 
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standpoint of the negotiations, the ideal time 
would be next autumn- after the negotiations have 
started, hut before one can know and debate their 
outcome. It is not improbable that Wilson will for 
his own reasons choose that timing, although if the 
polls are still unfavorable to Labour he may well 
stick it out to the constitutional limit. 
Whether this pace of events will in fact ensue 
depends largely on the French. It seems likely that 
the present team has a basically different appre-
ciation of the pros and cons of the question from 
de Gau lie 's regime. Its economic constituency, 
whether it be the agricultural interest groups or the 
industrialists in the Patrunat, is still basically 
unfavorable to British entry.' 8 Moreover, the 
renewed emphasis put on industrial modernization 
and structural readaptation by the Chaban-Delmas 
government an emphasis symbolized by the cre-
ation of a new public body. the lnstitut de 
developpement industriel (modelled in part after 
the British Industrial Reorganisation Corporation) 
and designed to encourage industrial mergers with-
in France suggested that time will be sought to 
put French industry on a more competitive, larger 
scale before pitting it fully against British 
competition. 
But the political makeup of this government is 
different. It includes Centrists and Giscardists. 
both of which groups are sympathetic to British 
entry. It is more sensitive than ever to the growing 
economic and political power of Germany, and has 
therefore more reason than before to welcome the 
British as a counterweight to German influence. 
This argument, in fact, is said to have made even 
the arch-Gaullist cabinet member, M. Debre, 
sympathetic lo the British application.' 9 And, 
perhaps most important of all, there is reason to 
suppose that a third French veto, in existing 
political circumstances, woulc.l strain severely and 
perhaps irreparably the viability of the Community 
as it now exists: the Five would draw their own 
conclusions. 
It is a safe bet that the French negotiating 
stance will not be demonstratively pro-British. A 
tough bargaining posture is indicated equally by 
the need to avoid antagonizing the Gaullist faithful 
and by the tactics of protecting French material 
interests. This tough position will certainly, more-
over. beskillfully cloaked in Community principle. 
Will the price that can be justified by such 
arguments be one that the British, in view of their 
economic situation and domestic opinion, will find 
too high'/ Maybe. Perhaps the French calculate that 
this will happen. thus allowing them to escape the 
blame for the result. 
But if it does not happen and the degree of 
political commitment to "going into Europe" by 
all British parties makes such a result a risky 
bet-then the question is whether the French will 
hold out for more than can be sold to the Five as a 
reasonable communitarian price. If it comes to 
this, the Five look like being resolute in resisting. If 
so. the British strategy of the last few years. to 
approach the EEC by cultivating good relations in 
Bonn, the Hague, and Rome, rather than primarily 
in Paris. will have been vindicated. 
Nature of The Enlarged Community 
If the British and other candidates do get in, 
what kind of club will they belong lo'' If the above 
account is correct. then the negotiations arc not 
likely to be about the fundamental objectives or 
characteristics of an enlarged Community. It seems 
improbable that anything below the level of 
general principle will be decided during their 
course: for example, about industrial policy. or 
scientific research policy. It is quite unlikely that 
the majority voting issue will be squarely faced and 
almost as unlikely that it will be tacitly resolved by 
the more face-saving expedient of simply putting 
those procedures into practice. Present uncer-
tainties about monetary coopcration seem more 
likely to change form than to disappear as a result 
of the negotiations. And if these areas. which are 
more or less covered by the Treaty of Rome, are 
left aside, how much more unlikely it is that the 
negotiations will come to grips with the "big 
questions" of defcnse and foreign policy, which lie 
outside the Treaty's scope, as Mr. Edward Heath 
and others have proposed. 20 It seems probable, 
therefore, that a British decision to pay the certain 
short-term costs involved will have to be justified 
by that many-sided act of faith: that the insti-
tutions will subsequently function: that the mini-
mum of monetary cooperation needed to make the 
customs union operable will be obtainable: that the 
kind of industrial policy favorable to the large 
British companies will be developed: that the 
"dynamic'' economic effects will produce their 
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beneficial result for the British economy; and that. 
as a result of all these positive developments. the 
EEC will continue to be the main foundation for 
··European" construction. Furthermore, it is rather 
clear that in many of these areas a comparable act 
of faith will be required on the Community's side 
of the table. 
Men of little faith may find this an unpersuasive 
case for-in the continentals' view-endangering the 
progress already made in European integration 
or- in the British view-for paying an economic 
penalty in the short-term in return for problematic 
long-term benefits. If the political will to achieve 
effective economic union, Rome Treaty style, docs 
not really exist. it might be more sensible-and to 
many important interests in Britain, the Six, and 
EFTA it would be preferable-to dispense with 
some of the pretensions and machinery of the 
Communities and establish in their place looser, 
more tlcxiblc arrangements. These might consist. 
for instance, of an industrial free trade area or 
customs union coupled with ad hoe arrangements 
for agriculture and improved but modest coop-
eration in defense, foreign policy, and finance. 
Such a notion was vaguely suggested by Chancellor 
Kiesin_ger ahout a year ago, and a similar idea was 
broached by General de Gaulle during the so-called 
"Soamcs affair." It would have the advantages of 
freeing questions of European organization to 
some extent from their presently excessive concern 
with agriculture; of making the monetary problem 
somewhat more manageable: of easing the costs to 
Britain: and of facilitating arrangements with 
EFTA countries. 
Should governments not assure themselves that 
the will to take the steps toward unity implied by 
the EEC approach really exists before rejecting this 
more modest, (for the British) less costly, and 
reasonably attractive alternative'' Should the nego-
tiations not deal with this question rather than 
being restricted to the technical questions of fitting 
the candidates into the Communities in their 
present form'/ The EEC governments have, in 
effect. answered "no." So, very clearly, has the 
Wilson government. although many continentals 
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suspect the British really prefer such a looser 
solution--and unquestionably many Britons would. 
The prevalent view among European govern-
ments today is that enlargement of the EEC 
provides the only possible basis for what might be 
called an EEC-EFTA settlement. Something 
approaching a consensus exists on that. whereas 
alternative approaches would run a greater risk of 
exposing still-unresolved national differences con-
cerning the purpose of the enterprise. The choice is 
not, therefore. between negotiating some optimum 
arrangement (the illusion that this option was real 
was a flaw in the British position in both previous 
negotiations with the Six: the Free Trade Area 
talks in 1957-58 and the 1961-63 negotiations) and 
the kind of negotiations described above as likely: 
it is between the latter and continued British 
exclusion from the main continental unit. Since 
separation is not likely to lead to a future political 
conjuncture more f'avorable than the present one 
for sorting out British-continental relations, there 
is a strong case for proceeding in the EEC 
framework. eyes wide open to the risks and 
disadvantages, as the best way avaibblc of 
"throwing one's lot in with Europe (with Britain)." 
If Britain gets in, there arc some pressures that 
will tend to produce the "right" solutions. Pressure 
from industrial quarters to put less emphasis on 
agriculture can be expected to grow. The enlarged 
Community will be of sufficient size that having an 
industrial policy will make sense. This docs not 
guarantee that one will be produced, but it 
provides a positive impetus missing in the Com-
munity of the Six. The pressure to make the 
institutions work- and hence to adopt majority 
voting as the norm in the Council- will become 
greater as the unworkability of reaching unanimity 
among ten members, even on minor issues, be-
comes clearer. And if that step is taken. it will 
bernmc easier for governments to take politically 
unpalatable decisions. which can then be justified 
to the electorates so: "We don't like it, we tried to 
avoid it, but we were outvoted." Perhaps the 
British government is basing its case less on such 
reasoning than upon the sheer inertia of past policy 
lines, imprisoned by its own past rhetoric. In either 
case. the potential is large. 
I Photographs courtesy of the Commission of the European 
Communities and British Information Services.] 
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NOTES 
I. September 22, 1969. 
2. August4,1969. 
3. The most complete, fresh look at the pros and cons is 
the CBI document, Britain in Europe (Loodon, 1970). For 
more concise and forceful, but quite well argued, examples, 
see the articles in the Financial Times of its Economics 
Editor, Samuel Brittan, May 29 and October 9, 1969, and 
of its Political Editor, David Watt, on July 11, 1969. Also 
noteworthy is the diatribe of Edwin Dale, the Washington 
correspondent of the New York Times printed in The 
Times of London on September 24, in which he advises the 
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